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Abstract 
EP elections have so far been consistently characterized as “second-order”. We hypothesize that key 
processes are emerging which undermine the appropriateness of this model. We argue that, as a 
consequence of EU policies trying to address the economic and financial crisis, a stronger 
politicization of Europe has emerged. Accordingly, the national consequences of EU policies have put 
Europe on the table of national electorates. Together, these processes may lead to an overall increase 
in saliency of EP elections, so we hypothesize, and to a homogenization of political competition across 
EU members. We explore this framework in the context of the 2009 and 2014 EP elections. In line 
with extant applications, we first attempt to assess the core predictions of the second-order model 
through tests on aggregate electoral results. We then investigate specific explanatory mechanisms for 
the 2014 EP elections, by relating party performance with party stance on political issues. 
Keywords 
European Parliament, European elections, Second-order elections. 
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Introduction 
Despite recent interest in the creation of a transnational European party system (Bardi et al., 2010) the 
latter still struggles with the transition from idea to reality. The “European party system” today largely 
constitutes a basket filled with national parties running politics in the member states. Thus, and rather 
unsurprisingly, campaigns preceding European Parliament elections have traditionally been dominated 
by national issues (de Vreese et al., 2006). Political science has therefore adopted and shared what can 
be qualified as the classical view of European elections: they are second order contests (Reif and 
Schmitt, 1980; van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996). According to the original second order model, 
European elections are driven by domestic factors, they are characterized by low turnout, they offer a 
platform for new parties to emerge, they are favorable to small rather than large parties and finally 
they tend to result in electoral losses for governing parties. Since the first direct elections to the 
European Parliament in 1979, the conceptual and empirical validity of the second order model has 
been confirmed again and again. 
More recently, however, scholars started to question some of the second order elements, above all 
trying to show the growing importance of supranational elements in EP elections (Bellucci et al., 
2010; Trechsel, 2010; Hix and Marsh, 2011; Shuck et al., 2011; Hobolt and Spoon, 2012). For some 
of these authors, the 2009 EP elections have become much substantively more “European”, and thus 
less second order, than previous contests. Besides both deeper and wider integration, the economic and 
financial crisis and the supranational reaction it has triggered are seen as key factors in the changing 
nature of EP elections. In this contribution, we support the argument of a “growing Europeanness of 
European elections” through empirical analyses aimed in two specific directions. By taking as a 
reference point the 2009 EP elections, we first demonstrate the diminishing relevance and predictive 
power of the second-order model for analyzing party performance. Secondly, and perhaps most 
importantly, we show that – compared to 2009 – party performance can be increasingly predicted by 
party stances on the same issues across the 28 EU countries, showing the first signs of the emergence 
of a common European debate, structured around a few key issues and producing effects in each of the 
member states; indeed testifying a Europeanization of EP elections. 
In the following section we present the expanding literature in this field and derive our theoretical 
considerations. The third section of this paper describes our data and explains our measures. This is 
followed by the empirical analyses, where we tests our hypotheses on aggregate electoral results (from 
the 2009 and 2014 EP elections), in line with extant applications on earlier elections. Finally, a 
concluding section discusses the major implications of our results. 
Beyond the second-order election model 
When in 1979 the first citizen-elected European Parliament took up its work, its partisan composition 
was essentially a patchwork of national parties’ representatives. Over thirty years later, the same 
observation still applies. While the process of European integration has led to profound changes in the 
competence structure between layers of government in Europe, with a gradual strengthening of the 
supranational institutions in almost all sectors of policy making, the same cannot be said for the 
process of representation and party competition. For sure, the elected members of the European 
Parliament started to connect to each other across the political spectrum and soon enough party groups 
emerged. Later on, even transnational European parties were founded, they were given institutional 
recognition and some financial resources that go with it. However, as important party groups have 
become to the exercise of power within the European Parliament, as largely irrelevant remain the 
European parties for electoral competition. They can be understood as platforms of weakly federated 
national parties, insufficiently developed for creating on their own a proper party system at European 
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level, understood here as a “system of interaction” (Sartori, 1976; Bardi and Mair, 2008). Clearly, as 
of today, no such European party system with comparable features shared by national systems has 
emerged (Bardi et al., 2010). The absence of a party system directly conditions the party competition: 
the lack of stable supranational party cues means that cognitive heuristics usually entering public 
opinion formation remain largely national in form. Therefore, it can be argued that European election 
campaigns are fought first and foremost on the basis of national political concerns (de Vreese et al., 
2006). As Reif and Schmitt (1980) argue, the national arena remains the most important one in the 
eyes of both the parties and the electorate. Accordingly, EP elections should be conceived as second-
order national elections, insofar as “there is less at stake as compared to first-order elections” (ibid.: 
8). As a consequence, parties dedicate comparatively less time and resources to second-order elections 
(Franklin et al., 1996; Franklin, 2001; Schmitt, 2005). This, in turn, negatively affects turnout in these 
elections. Regarding the substance of the campaigns, the second-order model emphasizes the lack of 
sufficient information on the position of parties regarding European issues. Given this information 
deficit, voters can only evaluate the competing parties on the basis of their performance and policy 
appeals at the national level. Yet another consequence of these elections being seen as less important 
than first-order elections is their propensity to serve as platforms for punishment of governments. 
They provide an opportunity for “sending a message to the rulers”, for sanctioning the government in 
place, for a symbolic lesson to be taught to the governing elite. Thus, European elections often become 
a referendum on incumbent governments’ performance (Lord, 2001) – a referendum where 
governments tend to be defeated. Clearly, such acts of “punishing of the incumbent” are made easier 
for voters who conceive of EP elections as elections where there is less at stake. It is most certainly 
cheaper and easier to send a warning to a governing party when the consequences remain relatively 
unimportant. In the same vein, because one can “throw away” one’s vote more easily than in elections 
where the future of one’s country may be at stake, voters are sometimes described as using their hearts 
instead of their heads in European elections, voting for parties and candidates that come closer to their 
‘real’ political preferences and ideological outlook (Oppenhuis et al., 1996). In turn, this tends to be 
problematic for larger parties (whether in government or opposition) as they lose votes to smaller 
parties.  
Summing up, according to the second order model: (1) there is lower turnout in European elections 
than in national parliamentary elections; (2) voters behave differently according to the type of election: 
some of them switch their vote from supporting a government party in national elections to punishing 
the latter in the second order election. The motivation for such a punishment can be twofold: either 
voters truly want to express their disappointment with the incumbents’ performance or they have voted 
for the governing party in the national elections due to some strategic calculus instead of voting for 
one’s closest party in terms of political preferences. In this latter case, European elections offer such 
strategic voters an arena for translating their “true” party preference into a corresponding vote. As a 
result, (3) larger as well as governing parties tend to lose votes in European elections, while smaller 
and opposition parties tend to win at the polls. 
Building and expanding on the second order model, it has been argued that parties’ fortunes in 
European elections also depend on the national electoral cycle. Depending on when EP elections take 
place within the national electoral cycle, citizens will show different patterns of voting behavior (Reif, 
1984; Marsh, 1998; Weber, 2007, 2011). Governments facing European elections during the 
honeymoon with their electorate (i.e., within their first year of tenure) are most likely to register minor 
losses or even none at all (Hix and Marsh, 2007). The swing away from voting for government parties 
is much more present when European elections take place in the middle of the national cycle, that is, 
when government parties’ popularity tends to be at its lowest. It is also at this moment that opposition 
parties tend to underline most strongly that the European vote should serve as a test for government 
performance. When European elections are held shortly before national elections, citizens have 
stronger incentives to act strategically, in order to influence upcoming national elections. Although 
there is always the opportunity to punish governing parties, the latter tend to lose less than they would 
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if the elections were held at the mid-point of the electoral cycle. In other words, governing parties lose 
votes anyway (as postulated by the second order model), but they lose less if the European election is 
held at the beginning, or at the end, of the national electoral cycle. 
Challenging this classical view on European elections, a growing body of literature has contended 
– albeit with varying degrees of success – that Europe matters, and that its influence on voting might 
have even increased over time due to the continuous strengthening of the EP’s powers (Schmitt, 2005) 
and a somewhat greater visibility of European issues during the campaign (de Vreese et al., 2006; 
Trechsel, 2010). With the sudden rise of parties opposing the European integration process in the 1994 
EP elections, scholars started to look into euroscepticism as a potential explanatory factor of electoral 
outcomes (Lodge, 1996; Taggart, 1998). Early individual-level analyses showed that voters opposing 
further integration were more likely to defect from government parties, although not necessarily giving 
their votes to eurosceptic parties (Marsh, 2003, 2007). At the aggregate level, Ferrara and Weishaupt 
(2004) hypothesized that parties opposing European integration were likely to perform well in EP 
elections. Although this hypothesis did not hold true empirically, they found that parties that “did not 
get their act together” on EU integration, i.e., those who have ambiguous views on Europe, 
systematically performed worse. Partial confirmation of the “anti-EU-leads-to-electoral-gains” thesis 
comes a few years later: in their pooled analysis of EP election results held between 1979 and 2004, 
Hix and Marsh (2007: 506) find indeed that “even when size and government status are held constant, 
anti-EU parties do much better than average”. However, the authors also characterize these effects as 
“minor” especially in light of the fact that anti-EU parties were “relatively rare” by 2004. As they 
conclude, “Europe remains at best a minor element in these elections in most cases” (ibid.). In a later 
analysis, Hix and Marsh (2011) attempt to quantify this effect. As it appears, anti-EU parties gained in 
average 6.7 percentage points (as compared to the previous national election). However, “more than a 
half of the gains in votes for anti-European parties in European Parliament elections can be explained 
by the fact that these parties tend to be small or new opposition parties” (Hix and Marsh, 2011: 8). 
Against this background, our study departs from an overarching research question: if the trend 
towards “Europe starts to matter in European elections” continued to intensify, could the 2014 EP 
elections mark a turning point and be considered the first genuinely European elections? We have two 
reasons to believe this to be the case: first, it might well be that the attempt of “presidentialising” EP 
elections through the so called race between spitzenkandidaten could have fostered interest in the 
elections and therefore mobilized parts of the electorate that would have otherwise preferred to stay 
away from the ballot box (Schmitt et al., 2015). Indeed, five spitzenkandidaten were chosen by the 
major political groups and started touring Europe in quest of voters. To cut a long story short: the 
expected effect on turnout did not take place. Initial analyses (Hobolt, 2014; Schmitt et al., 2015) 
show that there was a significant effect of “recognition” on mobilization: turnout was higher among 
those who recognized both Jean-Claude Juncker and Martin Schulz as being the respective 
spitzenkandidaten of the EPP and the S&D groups, respectively. However, this research also shows 
that the absolute level of “recognition” was poor, therefore preventing any tangible effect on overall 
turnout. Although the EPP candidate Juncker was appointed to the Presidency of the European 
Commission, the college of Commissioners is composed of members of four different party groups, 
jointly representing a grand-coalition à la Suisse rather than a proper party government. In other 
words, the electoral consequences of the, 2014 EP elections for the composition of the Commission 
remain weak, a fact that casts a doubt on positive turnout effects in the future. 
This leaves us with the second factor that could have contributed to making the, 2014 exercise of 
pan-European democracy particularly interesting to voters: their saliency in political terms. As we 
have seen, one of – if not the most fundamental factors leading to the characterization of European 
Parliamentary elections being second-order events is their relative irrelevance. The European 
Parliament had few powers when the citizens of the nine member states first elected its members in, 
1979. This has drastically changed since: over the past three decades, the European Parliament has 
Alexander H. Trechsel, Lorenzo De Sio and Diego Garzia 
4 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
 
become a very powerful legislator (Hix et al., 2007; Fossum and Menéndez, 2012). Most recently, the 
Lisbon Treaty has expanded co-decision to almost all legislation at the EU level. Also, together with 
its increased formal powers, the EP has arguably emancipated itself politically over time, holding the 
Commission accountable for its doings with ever-stronger levels of self-confidence. Maybe more 
importantly, though, the recent economic and financial crisis had profound effects on supranational 
governance. From Greece to Ireland, from the Euro to the breakdowns in the banking sector, this crisis 
has triggered European responses of unforeseeable depth. An impressive sequence of common binding 
economic measures (among others: the two-pack, the six-pack, and the fiscal compact) have shown to 
Europe’s voters just how powerful the EU has become – if not as a unitary actor, then at least as a 
locus of interaction between member states’ governments – in a variety of policy domains 
(significantly affecting the everyday life of European citizens) that used to be traditionally controlled 
by national governments. If Europe starts so visibly to matter on policy, one can expect that this will 
lead to an increasing importance of policy issues (and of the issue stances of political parties) for 
determining electoral performance in EP Elections; and – perhaps even more importantly – that a 
synchronization of such issues might take place, with the same issues becoming relevant across 
multiple countries. This would correspond to the emergence of the first signs of a common European 
debate, effectively testifying an increased Europeanization of EP elections. Furthermore, we would 
obviously expect that the EU integration process itself should appear among these common issues, 
with political forces competing on the very issue of how much Europe one needs when regulating the 
economy, and how much of a European Union one needs for overcoming the crisis. As a consequence 
of EU policies trying to address the economic and financial crisis, we argue then that a stronger 
politicization of Europe might be emerging, leading to a further erosion of the “permissive consensus” 
towards EU institutions and policies. Accordingly, the domestic consequences of EU policies have put 
Europe on the table of voters in the member states, thus reinforcing a polarization process on the pro-
/anti-Europe dimension. 
In other words, the combined effect of the overall strengthening of EP powers – both in absolute 
and relative terms – and the visibility of EU measures in the management of the economic and 
financial crisis leads us to believe that European Parliamentary elections may start to matter, becoming 
an electoral battlefield where something is at stake.  
As a result of our aforementioned considerations, we finally identify three hypotheses to be 
empirically tested: 
H1: For predicting electoral performance in EP elections, the second order model has less 
predictive power and less clear effects in 2014, compared to 2009; 
 
H2: Still for predicting electoral performance, issue stances of political parties have more 
predictive power in 2014 compared to 2009, even when estimating a common model for all EU-28 
countries; 
 
H3: Among the relevant issue stances, the party stances on EU integration increases its importance 
in 2014 (compared to 2009) as a predictor of electoral performance. 
Data and measures 
In line with a long-standing analytical approach (e.g., Schmitt, 2005; Hix and Marsh, 2007; 2011; 
Schmitt and Toygur; 2016) we rely on aggregate-level data to test conflicting hypotheses about 
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European elections and investigate why citizens switch votes from national to European elections.
1
 We 
thus focus on individual parties in a given election as our unit of analysis.
2
 The dependent variable is 
for each party the difference between the percentage of valid votes polled in the EP elections and that 
obtained at the previous national parliamentary elections held in the country.
3
 Relying on across-
election changes in vote rather than seat shares has the noteworthy advantage of allowing 
straightforward comparison between large parties (which are more likely to gain representation) as 
compared to smaller ones. 
The main independent variables that operationalize the second order model are as follows: 
- Size is the percentage of votes for each party in the last national election. This variable also serves as 
baseline to calculate the vote-share gap between national and the European elections; 
- Government is a dummy variable scoring ‘1’ for all parties included in the national government at 
the time of the EP elections and ‘0’ for all others; 
- Early is a dummy variable, which is intended to capture the relationship between sitting in 
government and the national electoral cycle. Following Hix and Marsh (2007) it takes the value of ‘1’ 
if the EP election under consideration took place during the “honeymoon period”, i.e. during the first 
twelve months following the national elections, and ‘0’ otherwise; 
- New party is also a dummy variable that assigns a value of ‘1’ to parties that are running for the first 
time in the EP elections under consideration and ‘0’ to all others. 
The coding of parties’ position on the issues comes from the EU Profiler (2009) and euandi (2014) 
projects. Whereas previous works (e.g., Hix and Marsh, 2007) resorted to expert survey data to place 
parties in the political space, our operational measures are derived from an iterative approach to party 
placement closely connected to the development of Internet-based Voting Advice Applications 
(VAAs). Both the 2009 EU Profiler and 2014 euandi VAA projects placed parties making use of such 
method, which consists in a combination of expert judgement and party self-placement (Trechsel and 
Mair, 2011; Garzia et al., 2015). The iterative method attempts to maximize the strengths of a 
combination of consolidated methodologies while at the same time trying to counterbalance the 
respective weaknesses. Expert coding and party self-placement take place independently, but the 
respective results are then compared in order to introduce a control mechanism. A major advantage of 
using these datasets lies in the large number of policy issues covered, in its emphasis on actual policy 
statements rather than on a generic classification on dimensions of political conflict, along with its 
immediate availability in the aftermath of the EP elections
4
.  
                                                     
1
 As a matter of fact, electoral outcomes in terms of aggregate measures of party success are not marred by the problem 
befalling individual-level data that “must rely on each respondent’s recall of past [voting] behavior, which is likely to 
understate change, particularly that from unpopular parties” (Hix and Marsh, 2007: 499).  
2
 In the analysis we included all parties already represented in either the national or the European parliament at the time of 
the EP election under analysis as well as parties standing a reasonable chance (on the basis of available pre-electoral 
polls) to gain representation in that given election. Based on these criteria, the total number of parties included in the 
analysis ranges between 228 in 2009 and 234 in 2014.  
3
 Take as an example the Italian Partito Democratico: with 27.4 percent of valid votes polled at the 2013 Italian 
parliamentary election and 40.8 percent at the 2014 EP election, its value on the dependent variable is 13.4 (measured in 
percentage points). 
4
 The latter two reasons, in turn, led us to rule out data from the CHES project – which rather relies on expert classification 
on general conflict dimensions, rather than on specific policy statements – and from the Euromanifesto project, whose 
data is still not available at the time of writing. 
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Results 
Table 1 presents the results of our empirical test of the second-order model for the 2009 and 2014 EP 
elections, with separate tests for Western and Central Eastern Europe. Our analysis takes into account 
what the literature has clearly highlighted, that is, the presence of geographical heterogeneities: the 
second-order model was documented to convincingly explain election outcomes in Western Europe, 
while it was seen as less powerful in the context of Central and Eastern Europe (Schmitt, 2005; Hix 
and Marsh, 2007, 2011; Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2012). In order to keep comparability with 
previous scholarship on the topic, we separately assess model dynamics for these two geographical 
areas. 
Results for Western Europe (Table 1, top pane) in 2009 present a typical second-order scenario. In 
bivariate terms (model 1), party size negatively affects electoral performance, meaning that larger 
parties tend to lose more than smaller parties. However, this size effect becomes non-significant as 
soon as the party’s government/opposition status is taken into account. When introduced (together 
with the appropriate main effect, see model 2), the interaction between party size and government 
status proves negative and significant, also making the main effect of size non-significant. In other 
words, it is large government parties that lose more, not large parties per se. This finding is in line with 
the predictions of the second-order model, and is confirmed even when taking into account the effects 
of the electoral cycle, modeled here in terms of a dummy variable, coding whether the EP election 
took place during the “honeymoon” period of the first twelve months after the last general election. 
The interaction of our “honeymoon” dummy with the governmental position is positive and 
significant, confirming how parties in office tend to do better than other parties when EP elections are 
held shortly after the general elections they just won. This is yet another confirmation of the 
(expanded) second-order model. However, the situation in 2014 appears slightly changed, and several 
elements emerge that suggest the appropriateness of the second-order model to have weakened. First, 
in terms of sheer predictive power: our R-squared decreases in the period under consideration from .39 
to .33 for the fully specified second-order model. Second, and more importantly, we observe an 
important change in terms of the dynamics related to party size. The model estimation for Western 
Europe in 2014 sees the disappearance of one of the key characteristics of the second-order model: the 
conditionality of party size effects on the parties’ government status. In other words, large parties are 
theoretically expected to experience larger losses than smaller parties only when they hold a 
government position. However, in 2014 the negative effect of party size (model 4) keeps its 
significance even when introducing its interaction with the party’s governmental position (model 5), 
which even results not significant in 2014. Thus, in 2014, large parties experience larger losses than 
small parties in general and regardless of their government status. The effect of government status is, 
however, still visible in its interaction with the electoral cycle. Moreover, electoral cycle effects show 
an even stronger punishment for parties in government. Compared to 2009, the effect of the electoral 
cycle has the same direction (parties in office tend to do better during the “honeymoon” year following 
national elections); however, the overall effect is slightly different. While this “honeymoon effect” 
allowed for a sheer “honeymoon bonus” in 2009 (compared to other parties), and no effect after the 
honeymoon, the situation in 2014 shows that the honeymoon allows parties in government to be 
somewhat protected from expected losses. Indeed, they do not suffer more than other parties (no 
significant effect), while after the honeymoon they suffer from a negative “cost of governing”. In this 
regard, a second-order dynamic is still visible, although the overall level of support for governing 
parties appears to decrease regardless of the electoral cycle. 
The pattern differs substantially when moving to Central and Eastern Europe (Table 1, bottom 
pane). In 2009, no strong second-order dynamics were detectable; apart from a significant, bivariate 
negative effect of party size (disappearing when introducing other second-order related predictors), no 
other significant effects, i.e., of office status and electoral cycle, emerge. Also, the predictive ability of 
the second-order model appears remarkably lower than in Western Europe. Indeed, our analysis 
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witnesses the very same pattern with regard to 2014 where we continue to observe an absence of 
strong second-order dynamics. Note also that the new parties, running for the first time in EP elections 
only have an advantage over established parties in the CEE region and only for the 2014 elections. In 
all other contexts, this aspect of the second order model seems to be negligible. 
Alexander H. Trechsel, Lorenzo De Sio and Diego Garzia 
8 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
 
Table 1: Reassessing the second-order model: Western Europe 
 2009 2014 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Size -0.221
***
 -0.113 -0.111 -0.251
***
 -0.136
**
 -0.140
*
 
 (0.050) (0.073) (0.073) (0.060) (0.046) (0.048) 
Government - 2.184 1.966 - -0.111 -1.927 
  (1.217) (1.183)  (1.459) (1.801) 
Size*Government - -0.209
*
 -0.219
**
 - -0.154 -0.132 
  (0.074) (0.072)  (0.099) (0.099) 
Early - - -3.560
***
 - - -1.556 
   (0.334)   (0.768) 
Early*Government - - 8.123
***
 - - 4.903
*
 
   (0.972)   (1.909) 
New Party -0.021 0.572 0.442 1.427 1.782 1.610 
 (0.876) (0.928) (0.929) (1.367) (1.250) (1.233) 
       
Constant 2.234
***
 1.641
*
 1.770
*
 2.349
**
 1.993
**
 2.405
**
 
 (0.547) (0.651) (0.643) (0.616) (0.604) (0.645) 
Observations 153 153 153 148 148 148 
R
2
 0.315 0.370 0.392 0.264 0.303 0.331 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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Table 1 (ctd.): Reassessing the second-order model: Central and Eastern Europe 
 2009 2014 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Size -0.213
**
 -0.033 -0.029 -0.204
*
 -0.126 -0.125 
 (0.065) (0.167) (0.169) (0.066) (0.069) (0.069) 
Government - 2.091 1.694 - 2.464 1.918 
  (2.170) (3.586)  (2.762) (3.047) 
Size*Government - -0.281 -0.268 - -0.161 -0.173 
  (0.267) (0.276)  (0.184) (0.164) 
Early - - 1.359 - - -0.382 
   (1.332)   (0.698) 
Early*Government - - -0.281 - - 4.191 
   (3.746)   (5.399) 
New Party 5.782 6.736
*
 7.058
*
 3.808
**
 4.426
**
 4.386
**
 
 (2.713) (2.912) (2.989) (1.198) (1.099) (1.258) 
       
Constant 1.397 0.210 -0.339 3.271
***
 1.915
*
 1.143 
 (0.986) (1.446) (1.633) (0.607) (0.831) (0.768) 
Observations 75 75 75 86 86 86 
R
2
 0.232 0.280 0.286 0.215 0.255 0.269 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001
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To strengthen these findings, we plotted all marginal effects for Western Europe as well as for Central 
and Eastern Europe separately. Figure 1 presents the marginal effects of party size, conditional on 
government position. In the West the classic second-order effect becomes visible only in 2009: size 
has a statistically significant (negative) effect only for parties in office. However, such an effect is 
substituted in 2014 by a sheer size effect: large parties lose whether in office or not. As for member 
states in the CEE region, size does not appear to bear any effect, regardless of parties’ governing status 
and EP elections under analysis.  
Figure 1 – Marginal effects of party size, conditional on government position  
  a. Western Europe, 2009   b. Western Europe, 2014 
 
  c. Central and Eastern Europe, 2009   d. Central and Eastern Europe, 2014 
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In Figure 2, we plot the marginal effects of government position, conditional on cycle effects (i.e., our 
“honeymoon” dummy). In the West, a classic second-order effect appears for both 2009 and 2014. As 
to the former, we find a positive effect on electoral outcomes when a governing party is in its 
“honeymoon”. In 2014, however, there is an overall negative effect for parties in office (i.e., 
significantly negative after honeymoon, simply not losing when in honeymoon). With regard to CEE, 
no corresponding significant effect can be detected. 
Figure 2 - Marginal effects of government position, conditional on cycle effects 
  a. Western Europe, 2009   b. Western Europe, 2014 
 
 c. Central and Eastern Europe, 2009  d. Central and Eastern Europe, 2014 
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Overall, our first hypothesis is confirmed. Indeed, it appears that for explaining electoral success in EP 
elections, the second order model loses its explanatory power between 2009 and 2014. While in the 
CEE region the second order model has never performed well from the outset, the loss of explanatory 
ability of the model appears especially pronounced for the case for Western Europe in 2014. There, 
some key dynamics – i.e., the effect of party size in interaction with governmental status – would seem 
to be undermined as well. 
We then proceed to testing of our second core hypothesis, i.e., that as a result of an emerging 
Europeanization of political dynamics, not only an overall trend of punishment of large, mainstream 
parties has taken place in 2014; but also, some form of EU-wide synchronization might be emerging in 
terms of which issue stances matter for electoral performance. According to our second hypothesis, 
electoral success at the polls should increasingly depend on the same issues across multiple countries. 
We then added to the model an additional set of variables, coding party issue stances on 17 issues on a 
5-point Likert scale ranging from “completely against” to “completely in favor” of a given issue 
statement (full wording is provided in Appendix). Most importantly, we proceeded to estimate a fixed-
effects model, i.e., not allowing coefficient for issue stances to vary across countries. This reveals how 
demanding our test is, as it implicitly assumes that issues that emerge as significant are so in all the 
countries included in the test. This of course goes mostly against the second-order model, as by 
definition second-order elections should be contested only on genuinely national issues: thus, different 
countries should see explanations of party performance based on different issues. Any evidence of a 
relevant contribution of our issue-based predictors, both in terms of predictive power and of 
significant effects, signals that common dynamics are emerging across many countries, pointing in 
turn to a potential emergence of some kind of Europeanization of the political space. 
The empirical test of this hypothesis is strongly connected to the availability of new data produced 
by the EU Profiler and euandi research projects. As mentioned above, the distinctive feature of these 
projects is the collection of party positions on a large set of policy issues. The comparison of the two 
datasets allows for the first time an assessment of the Europeanization of public opinion in 
comparative perspective across time (2009-2014). This said, our strategy for empirical analysis is 
rather straightforward. We estimated OLS regression models of party performance in EP elections 
relative to their performance in the last general elections based on party issue stances, by controlling 
for all the structural predictors of the second-order election model. In other words, we are testing 
whether parties characterized by specific issue positions (e.g., by a anti-immigration attitude) are 
consistently (and significantly) better performing than in the last national elections. Of course, the 
inclusion of the typical second-order model predictors is necessary to avoid spurious effects that might 
simply be the product of the second-order dynamics. Model estimation results are presented in Table 
2.  
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Table 2 – Testing the full model of party performance in EP elections
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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The first, simplest and clearest empirical test for our hypothesis emerges from the sheer comparison – 
between 2009 and 2014 – of the R-squared increase produced by the inclusion of issue stances. This 
measure expresses the extent to which issue stances provide increased legibility to electoral results 
(beyond the second-order model) in the two elections. In general, issue stances provide a significant 
increase in the predictive power of our models. In Western Europe this increase is .072 in 2009 
(from .392 to .464) and .077 in 2014 (from .331 to .408), thus showing a significant importance of 
issue stances, albeit still less relevant than second-order dynamics. Conversely, Central and Eastern 
Europe sees a lower impact of second-order dynamics, and a much larger (and increasing) importance 
of issues. While the R-squared increase was already .119 in 2009 (from .286 to .405), in 2014 it 
reaches a .192 increase (from .269 to .461), actually providing additional predictive power that is 
virtually as large as the original predictive power of our second-order-related predictors. In short, 
evidence of electoral consequences of an increasingly synchronized issue relevance appears clearly 
from our findings. 
Starting from Western Europe, already in 2009 there appeared an issue stance with a significant 
effect. All other issue stances being equal, parties supporting assimilative approaches to immigration, 
symbolized by the statement “immigrants should accept our culture and values”, suffered larger 
electoral losses. However, in 2014 effects appear much stronger and readable. Two issue stances 
appear as significant (and bearing larger effects). The first is support for the free-market statement 
“less work regulations to fight unemployment”: ceteris paribus, parties fully supporting this statement 
have consistently experienced better results that parties adopting the opposite position. The second 
significant issue stance is then, supporting now hypothesis 3, hostility to European integration. Parties 
supporting the statement “EU integration is a good thing” have systematically experienced worse 
performances than those opposing it. Likely as a result of the hot debate about economic policy in the 
Euro countries (with effects both within and outside the Eurozone), EU integration is not anymore 
perceived as a process with only positive, uncontroversial effects – an observation that is clearly 
matched by the success of Eurosceptic parties across Western European countries. 
Finally, an even clearer scenario emerges in Central Eastern Europe. While in 2009 no issue stance 
showed any significant effect, in 2014 support for the statement “less veto power in EU institutions” 
appears to have significantly rewarded political parties. This last finding appears on the one hand as an 
additional empirical support for hypothesis 3; at the same time, it inevitably appears in partial 
contradiction with what we found for Western Europe. Albeit in different terms (this statement is 
obviously pro-integration, but much more about a pragmatic attitude towards integration, aimed at 
increasing decisional and institutional efficiency), explanations for this contradiction have to be 
hypothesized by taking into account the very different subjective position that CEE countries 
(compared to Western countries) have towards the EU, as they are essentially receiving large 
economic (and political) benefits from the EU, while not experiencing to the same degree the 
problems connected to the Euro membership; a very different situation compared to Western 
countries, which might well justify a much more favorable attitude towards European integration. 
These results strongly confirm our second hypothesis: not only do we see an increasing importance 
of politics for electoral outcomes, i.e., positions on issues matter for EP elections, but there are signs 
of an emerging Europeanization of a common issue space. In line with our third hypothesis, it is 
European integration itself which provides for an important share of the common ground on which 
parties across all of Europe gain or lose votes. In Western Europe, it is opposing Europe that was, in 
2014, the only issue stance that helped parties gaining votes across the board. The picture is more or 
less reversed for CEE countries, though. Here, it is the institutional development of the EU – through a 
weakening of the unanimity principle for EU decisions – that led to electoral success. It could not be 
underlined too much that in 2014 the European dimension was the only issue dimension that 
significantly contributed to parties’ electoral fates at the polls both in the West and in the East. 
Clearly, this is a sign of a strong Europeanization of the 2014 EP elections. 
2014 as the first (truly) European elections? 
European University Institute 15 
Discussion and conclusions 
The expectations of a higher saliency for EP elections have been at least marginally fulfilled. The 
analysis has shown indeed that the second-order model is far from an obsolete analytical tool. 
However, there is something new. On the one hand, second-order dynamics clearly appear weaker in 
2014 compared to 2009. On the other hand, our analysis shows some kind of synchronization of issue 
importance across different countries, with a prominent role of European issues. This aspect of issue 
synchronization may sound auspicious to Euro-optimists, who might finally see the dawn of a long-
awaited Europeanization of EP campaigns. However, this Europeanization of EP campaigns contrasts 
optimistic expectations in two ways. First, there are no single EU-wide dynamics, but rather two 
opposing dynamics in the West and in the East. Secondly, and ironically enough for Euro-optimists, 
such East-West differences precisely concern the sign of the effect:in the West, it paid off, in 2014 to 
campaign against Europe, while the inverse was true for parties in the CEE region. At least in Western 
Europe, if there is one common denominator to campaigns and results in different countries, it is the 
success of parties taking positions mostly against (further) European integration, with the prominent 
example of the striking bleu Marine success of the Front National. 
Yet there is more to the picture, mainly because the rise of Euroscepticism appears to be emerging 
through a pattern that is much more complex than mostly suggested so far. According to conventional 
wisdom, anti-EU stances have been mostly championed by parties of the populist and Eurosceptic 
right, who have successfully politicized European issues — in a negative way and in terms of anti-
system protest — taking advantage of the widespread discontent caused by austerity policies. This is 
typically the case of the UKIP (26.6%) in the United Kingdom, of the aforementioned Front National 
(24.9%) in France and of the Danish People’s Party (26.6%) in Denmark. However, when looking 
across the 28 EU countries, the picture is much more varied. In fact, the conflict over EU integration 
has been politicized in different (and often conflicting) ways in different countries. First and foremost, 
in some countries (Spain being the most prominent example), no established party has actually taken 
anti-EU stances
5
. Secondly, while anti-EU stances have in general proved successful in many 
countries, this success has arrived through very different strategies. Syriza (26.6%) in Greece is a good 
example of a politicization of the issue in a leftist frame, focusing on EU-advocated austerity policies 
and on the current direction of the EU integration process, rather than on its very existence. The Five-
Star Movement in Italy (21.1%) has adopted a similar focus, although with a stronger anti-
establishment and anti-elite appeal. Finally, in other countries, it is even conservative mainstream 
parties that have been successful in “stealing” anti-EU issues from anti-establishment parties, thus 
limiting their electoral success. Prominent examples are those of the Finnish conservative party (KOK) 
and of Fidesz in Hungary, which have both succeeded – by playing this strategy – in containing the 
electoral advance of, respectively, the Finns Party and Jobbik. 
In short, the above findings suggest that, if some kind of Europeanization of party competition in 
EP elections can be claimed for 2014, it has not been taking place according to a naïve, mechanic, 
uniform emergence and spill-over of European issues through public opinion and party competition in 
all EU countries. What we see, instead, is that the entry, framing, politicization and saliency of 
European issues at the country level still appear controlled and negotiated by political parties, with 
their specific strategic choices conditioned by the spatial structure and dynamics of the party system, 
as well as by the structure of electoral incentives and constraints. As a result, when comparing 
different countries, European issues appear with different saliencies, framed differently, politicized in 
different directions and by different types of parties. In other words, while we argue that common 
issue dynamics are emerging across a large number of countries in the 2014 elections, it is inevitable 
to observe that such dynamics express themselves differently in each party system.  
                                                     
5
 At least by the 2014 elections. Moreover, anti-establishment parties like Podemos and Ciudadanos are apparently 
following a pattern close to the one adopted by Syriza: not anti-EU, but rather towards a change in the direction of the EU 
integration process. 
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APPENDIX. Question wording of issue statements 
 
KEEP WELFARE 
Social programmes should be maintained even at the cost of higher taxes 
 
CUT IMMIGRATION 
Immigration [into your country] should be made more restrictive 
 
IMMIGRANTS ACCEPT VALUES 
Immigrants from outside Europe should be required to accept our culture and values 
 
GAY MARRIAGE 
The legalisation of same sex marriages is a good thing 
 
SOFT DRUGS 
The legalisation of the personal use of soft drugs is to be welcomed 
 
EUTHANASIA 
Euthanasia should be legalised 
 
CUT SPENDING 
Government spending should be reduced in order to lower taxes 
 
EU TAXING POWER 
The EU should acquire its own tax raising powers 
 
LESS WORKERS' REGULATION 
Governments should reduce workers' protection regulations in order to fight unemployment 
 
RENEWABLE ENERGIES 
Renewable sources of energy should be supported even if this means higher energy costs 
 
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION 
The promotion of public transport should be fostered through green taxes (e.g. road taxing) 
 
HARSHER SENTENCES 
Criminals should be punished more severely 
 
EU SPEAKS WITH ONE VOICE 
On foreign policy issues the EU should speak with one voice 
 
EU DEFENCE POLICY 
The European Union should strengthen its security and defence policy 
 
EU INTEGRATION GOOD 
European integration is a good thing 
 
LESS VETO POWER IN EU 
Individual member states of the EU should have less veto power 
 
REFERENDUMS ON EU TREATIES 
Any new European Treaty should be subject to approval in a referendum in [your country] 
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